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A CALL FOR FEASIBLE  
MARKET-CONTROL MEASURES 
TO INCENTIVIZE ALTERNATIVE  
FUEL INNOVATION AND COMBAT  
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
MICHAEL DIGRANDE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Now the story of a wealthy nation that relies on fuels intrinsically 
tied to the looming dangers of global climate change, and the elected 
officials who have no choice but to reexamine the policies governing the 
production of those fuels.1 
If the above seems like an overly dramatic view of current United 
States environmental policy toward global climate change, perhaps it is 
important to remember how publicly divisive the debate has been 
surrounding the issue of global climate change.  Affecting both industrial 
and developing nations, global climate change creates conflicting 
political and economic interests that inhibit a collective solution to a 
             * Executive Comments Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review, J.D., 2014, Golden 
Gate University School of Law; B.A., Communications Studies, 2009, Sonoma State University.  I 
would like to extend my deep gratitude to Tudor Jones, the 2013-2014 Editorial Board, John Andrew 
Brunner-Brown, and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their patience and guidance throughout the 
editorial process. This article is dedicated to those who have mentored and supported my writing 
over the years—without you my words would have no form or purpose.  Thank you. 
 1 Cf. Arrested Development—Arrested Development Theme Song, YOUTUBE (June 25, 
2008), www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYqPs0LInls.  Referencing this FOX/Netflix comedy felt like an 
appropriate summation of the United States’ dysfunctional approach to market-based environmental 
policy. 
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global crisis.2  Adding fuel to the fire, a growing amount of scientific 
research suggests that global climate change is heavily influenced by the 
release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) stemming from human fossil fuel 
consumption.3 
The rise in GHG concentration has facilitated the warming of our 
planet, increasing the average global temperature over the past century.4  
In 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found 
that Earth’s combined surface and ocean temperature rose by 0.89 
degrees Celsius from 1901 to 2012, which included a temperature 
increase of 0.72 degrees Celsius from 1951 to 2012.5  The IPCC also 
noted that these elevated temperatures directly coincided with substantial 
changes to the environment, from the diminution of the Arctic ice sheets6 
to an unprecedented rise in sea level.7  The increased presence of these 
sweeping environmental changes necessitates a thorough examination of 
human fuel consumption and how fuel use contributes to the Earth’s 
warming through the emission of GHGs.8 
 2 See generally Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”—Struggling for Worldwide 
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 347 (2008) (“[E]conomics plays a 
major role in whether parties will act collectively to address climate change.  The economics of this 
global threat involves questions of perceived implementation costs, the role of particular industries 
in the emissions problem, and computer modeling in estimating the costs.  Estimating possible 
environmental and socioeconomic harms or costs resulting from climate change is encumbered by 
uncertainty as well.  Nevertheless, the economic impact of climate change is a key variable in 
generating global action.  Parties may be discouraged from acting collectively to address climate 
change if mitigation and abatement costs exceed the perceived benefits of action.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 3 See generally Causes of Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE—U.S. EPA, 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2014). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See THOMAS F. STOCKER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 
WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (2013) available at 
www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf. 
 6 Id. at 9 (“The average rate of ice loss from the Greenland ice sheet has very likely 
substantially increased from 34 [–6 to 74] Gt yr–1 over the period 1992 to 2001 to 215 [157 to 274] 
Gt yr–1 over the period 2002 to 2011.”). 
 7 Id. at 11 (“Since the early 1970s, glacier mass loss and ocean thermal expansion from 
warming together explain about 75% of the observed global mean sea level rise (high confidence). 
Over the period 1993 to 2010, global mean sea level rise is, with high confidence, consistent with the 
sum of the observed contributions from ocean thermal expansion due to warming (1.1 [0.8 to 1.4] 
mm yr–1), from changes in glaciers (0.76 [0.39 to 1.13] mm yr–1), Greenland ice sheet (0.33 [0.25 to 
0.41] mm yr–1), Antarctic ice sheet (0.27 [0.16 to 0.38] mm yr–1), and land water storage (0.38 [0.26 
to 0.49] mm yr–1). The sum of these contributions is 2.8 [2.3 to 3.4] mm yr–1.”). 
 8 See generally John M. Broder, Climate Talks in Durban Yield Limited Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/science/earth/countries-at-un-
conference-agree-to-draft-new-emissions-treaty.html. 
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The convergence of these energy-related interests and 
environmental impacts has largely hindered comprehensive efforts to 
address global climate change.9  For instance, the 2011 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Durban, South Africa10 
was a fruitless effort by the world’s largest nations to come to a 
consensus regarding the emissions reduction targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol—the most comprehensive worldwide proposal to curb GHG 
emissions to date.11  Unfortunately, large multi-nation conferences like 
Durban, and efforts like the Kyoto Protocol, illustrate why nations like 
the United States are reluctant to commit to stringent GHG reductions: 
Other major polluters remain exempt from such targets,12 further 
complicating a collective effort to halt the threat of global climate 
change. 
The world’s nations have yet to find common ground in mitigating 
their respective GHG contributions to global climate change.13  Further, 
the reticence to fashion a collective approach to GHG reduction exists 
not only at the international level, but domestically as well.  For the 
United States, the question of how state governments and Congress 
should share in the responsibility of enacting measures to reduce GHGs 
is largely in dispute, which ultimately affects domestic energy needs.14 
New proposals for market-based GHG reduction are fraught with 
friction here in the United States.  The latest example comes from 
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),15 promulgated by the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) under the authority of the 
 9 Id. 
 10 See generally Alex Kirby, Will the Kyoto Protocol Survive the Durban Climate Talks?, 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2011, www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/durban-climate-talks-kyoto-
protocol. The convention brought together negotiators and campaigners from all over the world in an 
effort to create a collective solution to the question of global climate change.  The convention ended 
with a refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty providing a framework for 
collective GHG reduction. Id. 
 11 See generally Broder, supra note 8. 
 12 Kirby, supra note 10 (“The developing countries want to keep the Protocol, the only 
legally binding agreement requiring the rich world to make necessary (but far from sufficient) cuts in 
emissions of greenhouse gases.  The U.S. has refused to ratify the Protocol, saying it won’t accept 
constraints that do not apply to the world’s other principal greenhouse polluter, China. And China, 
like other developing countries, is exempt from Kyoto’s provisions. The European Union and other 
industrialized countries say the U.S. will never ratify Kyoto, and that therefore the world should let it 
die and work instead on some new and as yet undefined way to reduce emissions.”). 
 13 See generally Broder, supra note 8. 
 14 Nicole Miller et al., Policy, Urban Form, and Tools for Measuring and Managing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The North American Problem, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 977-98 (2009) 
(“The scale of intervention required to reduce and adapt to the effects of climate change will require 
action at all levels of government and society.”). 
 15 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95480-95490 (Westlaw 2014). 
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California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (GWSA).16  Billed as 
a comprehensive effort to reduce California’s GHGs by 15% in 8 years, 
CARB puts forth an annually declining state-wide “cap” on GHG 
emissions, coupled with the ability to “trade” excess emissions credits.17  
CARB’s basis for this declining cap is the LCFS, which measures the 
carbon intensity for all major fuels present in the current energy 
market.18  Such a program is expected to reward companies that produce 
fuels with low GHG emissions, companies that continue to invest in the 
development of alternative fuels, while their excess emissions can be 
purchased by otherwise non-compliant entities as credits.19 
Unfortunately, rather than successfully pioneering green policy, 
California’s LCFS has met strong opposition from lawmakers and the 
energy industry alike. This Comment examines the implementation and 
perceived effectiveness of measures like California’s LCFS.  The 
following Parts explore the United States’ arrested development in 
implementing effective market-based measures to reduce GHGs, and 
how a market-based approach to incentivize fuel innovation is simply 
one facet in addressing the complex issue of global climate change.20 
Part I addresses the science of global warming, identifying the 
immediate need to transition from an economy reliant on fossil fuels to 
one buoyed by the promise of new, zero-emission fuels.  Part II provides 
background on how current notions of federalism shape environmental 
policy and the obstacles that have hindered comprehensive efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions in the United States.  Part III chronicles the 
feverish debate over California’s LCFS and how a federal market-based 
plan to reduce GHG emissions is vital to the United States.  Part IV 
proposes ways Congress can go about employing a low carbon fuel 
standard in a market-based approach to GHG reduction.  Part IV presents 
two trains of thought on how Congress can craft policy that will 
stimulate innovation in alternative fuels while reducing overall GHG 
emissions. 
 16 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq. (West 2014); see also California Proceeds 
with Cap-and-Trade Program, 4002 PUR UTIL. REG. NEWS 1, 1 (2011). 
 17 See also California Proceeds with Cap-and-Trade Program, 4002 PUR UTIL. REG. NEWS 
1, 1 (2011). 
 18 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95482 (Westlaw 2014); see also Debra Kahn, California Adopts 
Low-Carbon Fuel Standard, SCI. AM., Apr. 24, 2009, 
www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=california-adopts-low-car. 
 19 Kahn, supra note 18, Id. 
 20 Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on 
Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1164 (2010) (“If a ‘one size fits all’ approach was 
ill-suited to pollution control regimes, it is likely to be that much more problematic when addressing 
climate change adaptation issues.” (footnote omitted)). 
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I. MAKING A HUGE MISTAKE: FOSSIL FUELS, THE U.S. 
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR, AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
Understanding the expansive nature of global warming requires an 
examination of how human actions contribute to the overall greenhouse 
effect that warms our planet.21  Global climate change is a product of 
how GHGs—namely water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20)—absorb and trap energy from the sun, 
increasing Earth’s temperature year to year.22  While fluctuations in the 
Earth’s temperature have generally occurred over time, and GHGs form 
through natural processes, Earth’s continuous temperature increases 
since the Industrial Revolution suggest that natural processes are not the 
only catalysts for climate change.23 
Increased concentrations of GHGs, to levels well beyond their long-
term averages, provide the clearest indication that Earth’s warming is the 
result of something other than natural causes.  According to the IPCC, 
pre-Industrial Revolution atmospheric levels of CO2, CH4, and N20 
averaged around 280 parts per million (ppm),24 with current levels 
averaging around 391 ppm.25  IPCC’s monitoring further suggests that 
current concentrations of CO2, CH4, and N2O exceed the highest 
concentrations recorded in Earth’s ice cores within the past 800,000 
years.26 
Of all the GHGs present in our atmosphere, CO2 deserves special 
attention because increases in CO2 are directly tied to human activities.27  
According to the IPCC, an increased reliance on fossil fuels is 
responsible for the increase in CO2 concentrations in the post-Industrial 
Revolution era.28  Global CO2 emissions directly attributable to fossil 
 21 Edward Cameron, The Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2009) (“[T]he atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have 
increased markedly as a result of human activities . . . .”). 
 22 See generally Causes of Climate Change, supra note 3. 
 23 Id. 
 24 STOCKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 100. 
 25 Id. at 11 (“In 2011 the concentrations of these greenhouse gases were 391 ppm [. . .] and 
exceeded the pre-industrial levels by about 40%, 150%, and 20%, respectively.”). 
 26 Id. (“Concentrations of CO2, CH4, and N2O now substantially exceed the highest 
concentrations recorded in ice cores during the past 800,000 years. The mean rates of increase in 
atmospheric concentrations over the past century are, with very high confidence, unprecedented in 
the last 22,000 years.”). 
 27 See Morgan Brubaker, Comment, Dream of Californication: Constitutional Questions Put 
the Brakes on the Nation’s First Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 57-58 (2011). 
 28 STOCKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 17 (“It is extremely likely that more than half of the 
observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the 
5
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fuel consumption increased by 3.2% per year on average during 2000–
2009, compared to 1.0% in the 1990s and 1.9% in the 1980s.29  CO2 
concentrations rose by 7.8 pentagrams of carbon per year30 during 2000–
2009, relative to the 6.4 pentagrams per year during the 1990s, and 5.5 
pentagrams per year during 1980s.31  The rise in CO2 concentration is 
intimately tied to the process of global warming, accounting for “changes 
in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation 
amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather, 
including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves, and the intensity of 
tropical cyclones.”32  In other words, not only is the rise in CO2 
concentration occurring at an unprecedented rate, its global impact is 
being felt on an unprecedented scale.33 
The United States emitted roughly 6702 million metric tons of 
carbon equivalent34 in 2011, primarily through the use of petroleum 
 
anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together. 
The best estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming 
over this period.”). 
 29 STOCKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 489. These figures include 4% overall emissions from 
cement production during the relevant time periods. Id. 
 30 1 pentagram of carbon is the equivalent of 1 billion metric tons. 
 31 STOCKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 489. These figures include 4% overall emissions from 
cement production during the relevant time periods, as well as their standard deviation.  The error 
rates for the relevant decades are as follows: ± 0.6 for 2000-2009, ± 0.5 for 1990-1999, and ± 0.4 for 
1980-1989. Id. 
 32 See SUSAN SOLOMON ET AL., Direct Observations of Recent Climate Change, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007) available 
at www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-direct-observations.html. One specific 
example is the rise sea levels due to the Earth’s increased global temperature melting the polar ice 
caps at a faster rate.  The IPCC found that the global average sea level rose at a rate of 1.8 mm per 
year during 1961 to 2003. IPCC also found that the rate was faster over 1993 to 2003: About 3.1 mm 
per year. Id. tbl.SPM.1. 
 33 E. Britt Bailey, Comment, From Sea to Rising Sea: How Climate Change Challenges 
Coastal Land Use Laws, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 289, 292 (2011) (“Even if human-related emissions 
levels stabilized, the accumulated concentration of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to 
cause warming well into the next century, inducing many changes in the global climate system 
during the twenty-first century that will likely be larger than those observed during the twentieth 
century.  Based on the modeling of six possible emission scenarios, the IPCC projects that 
temperatures will increase between 1.8 and 4.0 degrees Celsius, or a change of about four degrees 
Fahrenheit, by 2099 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 34 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Climate Change, U.S. EPA, 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last updated Apr. 17, 2014). Overall 
emissions from fossils fuels are converted to their carbon dioxide equivalent, or “carbon equivalent.”  
This allows scientists and policymakers to compare GHG emissions using one emission type and 
concentration.  Carbon equivalent is calculated using the emission’s Global Warming Potential 
(GWP).  This practice was popularized by IPCC’s 2007 Working Group I. See SUSAN SOLOMON ET 
AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss3/5
337_DIGRANDE_ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT_FORMATTED 8/1/2014  1:50:54 PM 
2014] A Call for Feasible Market-Control Measures 343 
                                                                                                                                 
products and coal.35  In 2012, the American economic sector produced 
these CO2 emissions as follows: electricity production (32%), 
transportation (28%), commercial residential ventures (10%), agriculture 
(10%), and industry (20%).36  The transportation sector is of particular 
importance—the U.S. and China’s transportation sectors each produce 
more CO2 than any other nation’s total, overall CO2 emissions.37 
Since the 1980s, CO2 emissions increased more in the U.S. 
transportation sector than in any other domestic industry.38  Although the 
recession has slowed the gradual growth of CO2 emissions from the 
transportation sector,39 the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 
Annual Energy Outlook predicts CO2 emissions will continue to grow at 
a rate of 0.2% per year through 2035.40  Therefore, any serious talk about 
GHG reduction must address a change within the transportation sector, 
the portion of our domestic economy that is continuing to grow and is 
still largely dependent on GHG-producing fossil fuels.41 
II.   NO TOUCHING: FEDERALISM AND HOW GOVERNMENTAL 
SEPARATION HAS SLOWED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NOVEL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Discussing the implementation of environmental policy requires an 
examination of how modern notions of federalism imbue federal, state, 
and local government actors with the authority to set policy.  This 
Comment focuses specifically on the notion of environmental federalism, 
which “should be understood to refer more broadly to the study of the 
normative and positive consequences of the shared role of national and 
subnational units of government in controlling environmental 
 
(2007) available at www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html (illustrating the 
GWP of various GHG emissions). 
 35 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 34. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See David L. Green & Andrea Schafer, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. 
Transportation 2-6 (May 2003), available at www.c2es.org/docUploads/ustransp.pdf. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See generally The Close Tie Between Energy Consumption, Employment, and Recession, 
OURFINITEWORLD.COM (Sept. 17, 2012), http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/09/17/the-close-tie-
between-energy-consumption-employment-and-recession/ (illustrating how energy consumption is 
tied to employment, so that in times of lower employment there is less energy expended and 
therefore less GHGs emitted). 
 40 See Metric of the Month: February 2012—Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 
INSTITUTE FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY 2 (Feb. 2012), www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/file-
tool/MetricoftheMonth-FEB12CO2Emissions.pdf. 
 41 See SANYA CARLEY ET AL., Innovation in the Auto Industry: The Role of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 367, 367-68 (2011) (discussing 
petroleum dependence in the transportation sector). 
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problems.”42  Within this shared responsibility to control environmental 
problems like global warming rests a fragile tension over which 
governmental entity has the authority to set policy, which ultimately 
impacts the form of such policy.  The following Subparts explore how 
current notions of environmental federalism have slowed the creation 
and implementation of GHG-reduction measures in the United States. 
A. FAKEBLOCK43: OBSTACLES AND OVERSIGHTS WITHIN MODERN 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
GHGs like CO2 are airborne agents, and efforts to control their 
concentrations require an examination of the Clean Air Act (CAA).44  
Congress enacted the CAA in 1970 to function as the basis for national 
ambient air quality standards and hazardous air pollutant standards, as 
well as mechanisms to produce such limitations.45  While the CAA 
provides ample opportunities for federal, state, local, and non-
governmental agencies to participate in creating pollution control 
measures, the CAA is not without limitations in respect to preemptive 
federalism. 46  Many of the CAA’s provisions function as top-down 
mandates, setting pollution limits or compliance measures, while 
allowing federal agencies and state governments to act as architects in 
 42 WILLIAM M. SHOBE & DALLAS BURTRAW, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA CENTER FOR 
ECONOMIC AND POLICY STUDIES, RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN A WARMING 
WORLD 2 (Jan. 17, 2012), available at 
http://econ.ccps.virginia.edu/RePEc_docs/ceps_docs/RethinkingEnvFederalism_wp12-01.pdf. 
 43 During Arrested Development’s fourth season, George Michael Bluth (played by Michael 
Cera) tricked his father, Michael Bluth (played by Jason Bateman), into thinking he is developing a 
privacy app called “Fakeblock.”  The app was described as an anti-social network that builds a wall 
around one’s online privacy, when it reality, George Michael was developing a music app that 
emulated the percussion of a wood block.  The isolationist sentiment of George Michael’s 
supposedly anti-social network serves as an appropriate parallel to the artificial separatism that runs 
throughout environmental federalism.  The following Section details how this separatism affects the 
creation and implementation of environmental policy in the United States. See generally Fakeblock, 
ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT WIKI http://arresteddevelopment.wikia.com/wiki/Fakeblock (last visited 
May 14, 2014); see also Sarah A. Downey, Ode to Arrested Development’s Fakeblock from a Real 
Privacy Company, THE ONLINE PRIVACY BLOG—ABINE, May 29, 2013, 
www.abine.com/blog/2013/fakeblock/ (last visited May 14, 2014) (discussing the anti-social 
network aspect of Fakeblock in more detail). 
 44 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et seq. (Westlaw 2014). 
 45 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(c) (Westlaw 2014) (“A primary goal of this chapter is 
to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, 
consistent with the provisions of this chapter, for [air] pollution prevention.”); see generally 
Background of the Federal Clean Air Act, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
www.arb.ca.gov/fcaa/fcaa.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2010). 
 46 See Hari M. Osofsky, The Future of Environmental Law and Complexities of Scale: 
Federalism Experiments with the Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 79, 83-86 (2010). 
8
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designing the implementation of their own pollution controls.47  In its 
most ideal setting, the CAA lays out a cooperative division of 
responsibility built to shift over time,48 with states providing pressure for 
federal standards and industry reform, while federal agencies provide 
minimum guidelines as well as legislative stability.49 
Successful measures adopted through the CAA’s framework of 
environmental federalism are typically lauded because of their flexibility.  
For example, Title IV of the 1990 CAA Amendments sought to reduce 
sulfur dioxide emissions through annually increasing emission reduction 
targets, while allowing utilities to self-regulate in achieving those 
limits.50  Title IV allowed utilities that emit sulfur dioxide to use low-
sulfur burning coal, install pollution control devices,51 or trade emissions 
credits with entities operating below the yearly sulfur dioxide limit.52  As 
of 1997, these utilities had not only met their sulfur dioxide reduction 
goals but had built up excess credit reserves53 equating to the reduction 
of about six million tons in sulfur dioxide.54  “By 2007, annual emissions 
had declined below the [program’s] 9 million ton goal (a 43% reduction 
 47 Id. (“For example, states create implementation plans for meeting the national air quality 
standards.”). 
 48 Id. at 90 (“The relevant mechanisms of the CAA allow complex regulatory dynamics that 
involve state dominated action and federal decision making, state-federal and state-state interactions, 
top-down and bottom-up pressure, and conflict and cooperation at different moments.”). 
 49 See generally J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: 
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1504-10 (2007). 
 50 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651(b) (Westlaw 2014); see generally The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, U.S. EPA, http://epa.gov/air/caa/caaa_overview.html (last visited May 13, 2014). 
 51 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651n(c) (Westlaw 2014) (highlighting alternative methods of compliance 
for sulfur dioxide emitters under Title IV); see Power Plant Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide and 
Nitrogen Oxides Continue To Decline in 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2013), 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10151. 
 52 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651b (Westlaw 2014) (providing an overview of the sulfur dioxide credit 
program); see also Nadine Etienne, Note, Should We Go Green for the Waxman-Markey Bill?, 21 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 349 (2010) (“Under the cap-and-trade model, the government 
establishes a maximum pollution limit (‘cap’) and allows parties to use markets to achieve the cap 
either by trading allowances or obtaining credits (‘trade’). Accordingly, the polluters are free to use 
their allowances or purchase extra allowances from other polluters. A facility that reduces its amount 
of GHG emissions below its allowance limit may sell the excess.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 53 See ROBERT N. STAVINS ET AL., What Can We Learn from the Grand Experiment? 
Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. no. 3, at 69-88, 71 (1998). 
 54 While other emissions credit systems have used some form of the sulfur dioxide trading 
mechanisms popularized by Title IV of the 1990 CAA Amendments, a thorough examination of 
emissions trading is outside the scope of this Comment. This Comment touches on current trading 
schemes insofar as they relate to industry emissions targets, not the actual logistics or auctions that 
facilitate the trading of credits themselves. 
9
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from 1990 levels),”55 illustrating that Title IV’s ultimate success is the 
full realization and execution of environmental federalism. 
However, successes such as Title IV are exceptions and not the rule.  
The battle in U.S. environmental policy centers on disputes over the 
scope of existing authority to regulate or promulgate pollution 
standards.56  States and federal entities struggle over their ability to 
create comprehensive GHG reform because federalism concerns pit 
inflexible federal ceilings against inconsistent state regulations, rather 
than apportioning each task to the governmental level best equipped to 
handle it.57  Ultimately, the standards that result from any level of 
government involvement are either too lenient or too limited to assist in 
achieving sustainable GHG reductions within the transportation sector.58 
Massachusetts v. EPA59 illustrates the legislative disconnect 
emblematic of modern environmental policy.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Massachusetts came nearly four decades after the CAA was 
enacted, holding that the EPA was authorized to “regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a 
‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to climate change.”60  The 
decision came in spite of the fact that GHGs have affected the Earth’s 
temperature since the Industrial Revolution,61 and that the CAA’s 
sweeping definition of air pollutant includes nearly any physical or 
chemical substance emitted into the air.62  In other words—it took over 
forty years to determine which governmental entities could regulate CO2.   
 55 ROBERT N. STAVINS ET AL., The US Sulphur Dioxide Cap and Trade Programme and 
Lessons for Climate Policy, VOX (Aug. 12, 2012), www.voxeu.org/article/lessons-climate-policy-us-
sulphur-dioxide-cap-and-trade-programme. 
 56 See Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting Preemption in Environmental Law: An Analysis of 
the Cost-Externalization Argument and California Assembly Bill 1493, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 266 
(2009) (exploring the interstate effects of current environmental federalism, suggesting a balance 
between the right amount of cost-externalization protection and decentralized policymaking). 
 57 See generally DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 49, at 1503-06. 
 58 Id. at 1522 (“[T]o the dismay of environmentalists, the state measures are not likely to 
produce large reductions nationally. Few states have set clear emissions reductions targets, and 
fewer still have designed policies to achieve them. Even the most ambitious state targets are 
strikingly low, the deadlines generous, and the percentage of emitters covered quite limited.”). 
 59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 60 Id. at 525; see also Michael B. Gerrard & J. Cullen Howe, Global Climate Change: Legal 
Summary, SS028 ALI-ABA 583, 613 (2011). 
 61 See STOCKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 11. 
 62 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-9 (The Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of ‘air 
pollutant’ includes “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, 
chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air . . . .” § 
7602(g) (emphasis added). On its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever 
stripe, and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word “any.”); see also 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7602(g) (Westlaw 2014). 
10
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Congress could have settled this issue far sooner, given the scientific 
research available in the late 1960s, research that detailed the steady rise 
in CO2 concentrations and its potential to alter the planet’s temperature.63 
Federal ambiguity also mutes the effectiveness of novel GHG 
reduction measures like the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), found 
within the CAA.64  In an effort to promote the production of renewable 
fuels with lower GHG emissions, the RFS charges EPA with setting 
annual volumetric targets for refineries and fuel blenders.65  The RFS 
requires EPA to “promulgate regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or 
introduced into commerce . . . contains the applicable volume of 
renewable fuel,”66 in the hopes that U.S. refineries continue to develop 
fuels from renewable sources while reducing its consumption of fossil 
fuels.67 
Yet unlike Title IV, under which federal mandates promoted the use 
of available alternatives to reduce sulfur dioxide, nothing in the RFS 
specifies the mechanisms states may use to produce these volumetric 
targets68 or how states should continue to refine renewable fuels 
overtime.  Though the EPA is responsible for assessing yearly targets 
based on current nationwide production capability, there are concerns 
regarding the means to produce current renewable fuels (corn-based 
ethanol69 being the most popular), and how their long-term use might 
 63 See generally Justin Gillis, A Scientist, His Work and a Climate Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2010, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/science/earth/22carbon.html?pagewanted=all. This article discusses 
the legacy and research of Dr. Charles David Keeling.  Keeling’s work developed the methods used 
for measuring atmospheric CO2 concentrations in the early 1950s.  “By the late 1960s, a decade after 
Dr. Keeling began his measurements, the trend of rising carbon dioxide was undeniable, and 
scientists began to warn of the potential for a big increase in the temperature of the earth.” Id. 
 64 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545 (Westlaw 2014). 
 65 United States Low Carbon Fuel Policies, INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (Apr. 12, 
2011), available at www.theicct.org/us-low-carbon-fuel-policies. 
 66 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(o)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2014). 
 67 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(o)(1)(J) (Westlaw 2014) (“The term ‘renewable fuel’ means fuel that 
is produced from renewable biomass and that is used to replace or reduce the quantity of fossil fuel 
present in a transportation fuel.”). 
 68 Jamie Konopacky, Comment, Refueling Biofuel Legislation: Incorporating Social 
Sustainability Principles to Protect Land Rights, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 401, 406 (2012) (“Although the 
RFS2 legislation begins to address environmental sustainability, its provisions are minimal at best.  
The only environmental conditionality in the law is a requirement that biofuels being used to reach 
the blending targets reduce greenhouse gas emissions below the level of traditional fuels.”). 
 69 Timothy A. Wise, U.S. Corn Ethanol Fuels Food Crisis in Developing Countries, 
ALJAZEERA, Oct. 10, 2012, 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210993632838545.html (“Ethanol now consumes 
roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago. The biggest jump 
came after the US Congress enacted the RFS in 2005 then expanded it dramatically in 2007.”). 
11
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affect states disproportionally.70  Furthermore, the RFS has yielded 
volumes of renewable fuels well below federal volumetric targets, which 
is unsurprising given the measure’s weak federal guidance.71 
GHG reduction measures rarely succeed without strong federal 
guidance, and strong federal guidance is typically absent.  Within this 
void of federal silence, states have been left to fashion their own GHG 
reduction schemes.  California is one such state, having developed a 
market-based approach to reduce its GHG emissions.  However, as the 
following Subpart illustrates, the strict governmental separation found in 
modern federalism has slowed California’s efforts to reduce statewide 
GHG emissions. 
B. EGGS IN ONE BASKET: CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD AND ITS GAMBIT TO OVERCOME FEDERAL INACTION 
After a long history of GHG reduction policies lacking in tangible 
environmental benefits, California enacted the GWSA.72  The GWSA 
grants CARB the authority to fashion market-based emission reductions 
that increase annually for sources or categories that produce GHGs.73  
Emission limits are measured by the LCFS, which assesses the total 
GHG emissions of a fuel’s life cycle—its “carbon intensity.”74  A fuel’s 
carbon intensity is calculated by considering its direct emissions 
(production, transportation, and use) and indirect effects (changes in land 
 70 See generally Ned Stowe, Should We Waive the Renewable Fuel Standard in the Wake of 
the Drought?, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, Sept. 24, 2012, 
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/09/q-a-on-waiving-renewable-fuel-
standard-in-the-wake-of-the-2012-heat-wave-and-drought?page=all (discussing the 2012 drought 
and its affect on corn prices). 
 71 Todd Woody, The Brutal Bust in Next-Generation Biofuels in One Chart, ATLANTIC, Apr. 
23, 2014, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/the-brutal-bust-in-next-generation-
biofuels-in-one-chart/361104/ (“The official 2013 target official for cellulosic biofuel—made from 
the non-edible parts of plants, wood waste and other non-food feedstocks—was 1.75 billion gallons.  
That was the volume of biofuels Congress mandated that oil refiners blend with gasoline in an effort 
to fight climate change.  The EPA subsequently slashed that target to 6 million gallons last year.  
And on Earth Day yesterday the agency finally came down to earth and issued a retroactive target to 
reflect the actual production of biofuels in 2013.  The number: 810,185 gallons.”). 
 72 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq. (Westlaw 2014). 
 73 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561 (Westlaw 2014) (illustrating how the state board 
is responsible of developing a compliance plan to reduce California’s overall GHG emissions by 
2020); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95480 (Westlaw 2014) (identifying the implementation of 
a low carbon fuel standard under the GWSA); see generally Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming 
Solutions Act, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY—AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 74 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95482 (Westlaw 2014); see also Todd J. Guerrero, Lawsuit: 
LCFS Violates US Constitution, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG., Jan. 4, 2010, 
www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/6246/lawsuit—lcfs-violates-us-constitution. 
12
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use), measuring the overall GHG impact at every stage of its 
development.75  The GWSA charges the CARB with setting the LCFS’s 
carbon intensity measurements as new alternative fuels are introduced to 
the marketplace, or as manufacturing methods change, producing fuels 
with fewer GHG emissions.76 
California’s LCFS features a “cap-and-trade” framework.77  CARB 
sets annually increasing reduction targets for GHG emissions based on 
the LCFS, while non-compliant entities are able to purchase emissions 
credits from fuel producers and blenders that emit GHGs under the 
annual threshold.78  Entities participating in the program are able to meet 
part of their compliance obligations through the trading and purchase of 
these credits.79  From there, the cap is reduced annually in the continued 
effort to cut 15% of California’s GHG emissions by 2020.80 
Despite being the first of its kind regulation to implement a life 
cycle measurement for GHG emissions, California’s LCFS faces familiar 
federalism challenges when it comes to the scope of its reach.  Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene81 placed California’s LCFS 
firmly in its cross hairs, challenging the state’s ability to promulgate such 
a market measure.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California held the LCFS was unconstitutional, violating the Commerce 
 75 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95481(16) (Westlaw 2014) (“‘Carbon intensity’ means the 
amount of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered, expressed in 
grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per megajoule (gCO2E/MJ).”); 17 § 95481(38) (“‘Lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions’ means the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including 
direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use 
changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all 
stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction 
through the distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the 
mass values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming 
potential.”). 
 76 Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, supra note 73. 
 77 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95485 (Westlaw 2014) (illustrating how emmissions credits are 
calculated for compliant entities under the LCFS); see also Gerrard & Howe, supra note 60, at 633. 
 78 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95488 (Westlaw 2014); see also Gerrard & Howe, supra note 
60, Id. 
 79 17 § 95488 (providing an overview of the trading program for emission credits under the 
LCFS); see also Gerrard & Howe, supra note 60, Id. (“In 2012, CARB will distribute emission 
allowances equal to the declining cap.  During the first few years of the program, CARB has 
proposed allocating most of the allowances for free.”). 
 80 Gerrard & Howe, supra note 60, Id. (“These draft rules establish a phased in compliance 
framework designed to reduce the state’s emissions to approximately 15% below 2012 levels by 
2020.”). 
 81 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011), 
rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for 
cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2014) (nos. 13-1148, 13-1149), petition for cert. filed 
(U.S. Apr. 21, 2014) (no. 13-1308). 
13
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Clause by ascribing a higher carbon intensity rating to out-of-state 
ethanol producers using Midwest corn.82  Though ethanol produced in 
California is chemically identical83 to the ethanol produced outside its 
borders, the district court held that the difference in their carbon intensity 
disadvantaged out-of state producers84 doing business in California, 
thereby insulating the state’s own ethanol market in the process.85  The 
court held that the California overstepped its jurisdictional authority in 
enacting the LCFS, because the carbon intensity’s effect on out-of-state 
producers amounted to a regulation of interstate commerce, a power 
reserved to the federal government under the Commerce Clause.86  The 
Ninth Circuit has since reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that 
California’s LCFS does not violate the Commerce Clause,87 but Rocky 
Mountain’s slow litigious crawl88 to the United States Supreme Court 
also illustrates a larger problem with the parameters of current 
environmental federalism. 
Rocky Mountain exemplifies how the function of environmental 
policy is often debated more furiously than the feasibility of the measure 
itself.  While states may bring about a regulatory “sweet spot,” a point 
 82 Id. at 1087 (noting plaintiffs’ allegation that using the life cycle measurements to account 
for all production, manufacturing, transportation, and land use, CARB assigned “Midwest ethanol 
over 10% higher carbon intensity over its California ethanol counterpart”). 
 83 Id. at 1088 (“While the ethanol made in the Midwest and California are physically and 
chemically identical when ultimately mixed with petroleum, and while the pathways may be the 
similar, this Court appreciates that the carbon intensities of these two otherwise-identical products 
are different according to lifecycle analysis.”). 
 84 Id. at 1089 (“Defendants admit that in California there is a price difference between the 
90.1 CI corn ethanol and the 98.4 CI corn ethanol.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 85 Id. (“[T]he pressure the LCFS puts on out-of-state competitors to reduce its CI score to 
become equal to those scores in California makes doing business in the state more costly for out-of-
state companies relative to in-state firms.” (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis 
omitted)). 
 86 Id. at 1091 (“States and localities may not attach restrictions to imports in order to control 
commerce in other States.  Doing so would extend the State’s police power beyond its jurisdictional 
bounds.” (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)). 
 87 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Absent discrimination, we will uphold the law ‘unless the burden imposed on [interstate] 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”), rev’g Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2014) (nos. 13-1148, 13-1149), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 21, 
2014) (no. 13-1308). 
 88 See Carolyn Whetzel, Ethanol Groups Seek Supreme Court Review of California’s Low-
Carbon Fuel Standard, BLOOMBERG BNA, Mar. 21, 2014, www.bna.com/ethanol-groups-seek-
n17179888987/ (“The Renewable Fuels Association and Growth Energy filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari March 20, challenging an appellate court decision that reversed a district court’s finding 
that the fuel standard discriminates against out-of-state commerce and is an extraterritorial 
regulation.”). 
14
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where both industry and state unrest prompts federal action,89 such a 
strategy is passive in light of the quickly escalating threat of global 
climate change.  Unfortunately, rather than functioning as a cooperative 
mechanism for lawmaking, current federalism90 produces legislation that 
is either ill-fitted or poorly implemented for present environmental and 
economic needs.91 
While Congress languishes in providing strong, regulatory 
guidance, states are left to confront a second hurdle in developing 
successful GHG reduction policies.  As discussed in Part I, meaningful 
GHG reduction must account for long-term economic sustainability 
within the transportation sector.  Alongside this modern and limiting 
view of federalism, the economic interests relevant to transitioning away 
from fossil fuels present a unique challenge in creating feasible, market-
based GHG reductions.  The following Part explores these converging 
economic interests by examining the contested feasibility of California’s 
LCFS. 
III. HOT MESS: THE FIGHT OVER CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD AND ITS LONG-TERM FEASIBILITY 
Federalism concerns are not the only concerns slowing the 
implementation of GHG reduction policies.  Maintaining regional 
 89 DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 49, at 1559 (“By unnerving industry while leaving 
environmentalists unsatisfied, they have created the perfect conditions under which both pro-
regulatory and anti-regulatory constituencies will simultaneously appeal to the federal government 
for relief. This illustrates how states can be incremental catalysts of a federal policy response, 
increasing the likelihood that Congress will act sooner rather than later.”). 
 90 J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How To Clean 
up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 981-82 (1997), 
(“It is no surprise, therefore, that a central and raging debate in environmental law focuses on the 
balance of power between state and federal governments and the merit of the system of so-called 
‘cooperative federalism’ that has been in place for twenty-five years and under which 
the federal government has taken the policy-shaping and standard-setting role for the states and their 
local subdivisions. That debate, however, largely ignores the qualities that complexity theory 
suggests are needed in adaptive systems. To be truly adaptive, the environmental law system must be 
able to operate with many coupled patches arrayed on a variety of nested, coupled levels of 
organization, including levels intermediate in structure to the bottom (local) and top (federal) of the 
system.”). 
 91 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 777 (2006) (“Congress 
has narrowed the responsibilities of some federal agencies to consider the adverse environmental 
implications of their decisions by creating categorical exclusions from NEPA. It also has exempted 
some federal activities, primarily military activities, from pre-existing statutory constraints on their 
ability to pollute. In addition, Congress has made it more difficult for federal agencies such as EPA 
to restrict environmentally damaging conducted by others, in part by burying those agencies under a 
mountain of analytical paperwork and by requiring agencies to employ analytical techniques that are 
inherently inimical to the protection of environmental values that are difficult to quantify.”). 
15
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economic stability is a crucial component of sustainable GHG reduction, 
especially considering the link between the emission of GHGs and the 
transportation sector.92  Using California’s LCFS as an example, the 
constitutional questions outlined in Part II also coincide with industry 
concerns about the overall feasibility of California’s novel market-based 
approach to GHG reduction. 
Subpart A details the California refinery industry’s concerns about 
the LCFS, such as (1) an insufficient supply of renewable fuels to meet 
declining LCFS emissions targets, (2) the LCFS negatively impacting the 
price of petroleum-based fuels, and (3) the LCFS causing a substantial 
harm to California’s job market and economy.  Subpart B explores a 
second series of studies tracking the first three years of the LCFS 
program.  These studies suggest that the LCFS is making progress on 
several fronts with its ability to (1) advance alternative fuel technology, 
(2) create a surplus of carbon credits within the 2011-2013 compliance 
period, and (3) produce monetary savings for consumers throughout the 
LCFS’s nine-year implementation.  Despite the competing nature of 
these studies, what emerges in Subpart C is the realization that Congress 
must provide strong guidelines to help reduce GHG emissions, no matter 
how California’s experiment pans out. 
A. THERE IS ALWAYS MONEY IN THE PETROLEUM STAND93: THE 
REFINERY INDUSTRY FORECASTS DISASTER FOR CALIFORNIA’S 
LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 
The refinery industry paints the LCFS as an unmitigated disaster.  
One of the first concerns the refining industry has is whether the current 
generation of renewable fuels94 (ethanol95 and biodiesel blends96) can be 
 92 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 33 (illustrating that the 
transportation sector accounted for 28% of the United States’ overall GHG emissions as recently as 
2011). 
 93 Early in the first season of Arrested Development, Michael Bluth (played by Jason 
Bateman) informs his imprisoned father George Bluth Sr. (played by Jeffrey Tambor), that he has 
burned down Bluth’s Original Frozen Banana Stand.  The stand was owned by the Bluth Company 
and sold frozen bananas to the public, about which George Sr. often remarked, “There’s always 
money in the banana stand.”  Michael burned the banana stand down as an act of protest against his 
father but failed to realize that George Sr. was being literal—that there was over $250,000 lining the 
inside of the banana stand’s walls.  The banana stand’s function as a hidden rainy-day fund mirrors 
how the oil industry sees petroleum-based fuels, both as its lifeline and as its source of income.  The 
following section details the refinery industry’s reliance and concern surrounding the status of its 
rain-day fund—the fossil fuels that hold its financial well-being; see generally Bluth’s Original 
Frozen Banana Stand, ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT WIKI (last visited May 3, 2014) 
http://arresteddevelopment.wikia.com/wiki/Bluth’s_Original_Frozen_Banana_Stand. 
 94 See generally Biofuels Overview, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
www.c2es.org/technology/overview/biofuels (last visited May 14, 2014) (“Biofuels encompass any 
16
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produced in sufficient quantities to meet increasing fuel demand, while 
supporting the LCFS’s 15% GHG reduction target by 2020.97  CARB 
projects an increase in California’s ethanol demand, which could rise 
from 1875 million gallons in 2015 to 2689 million gallons a year by 
2020.98  Moreover, the carbon intensities for California and Midwest-
produced ethanol are currently not compliant through 2020.99  According 
to the California Energy Commission, the lack of local ethanol 
production also limits California’s ethanol supply100 as the state’s 
ethanol consumption rose to roughly 1450 million gallons in 2010, with 
about 1350 million coming from out-of-state suppliers.101  The refining 
industry points out that the largest exporter of LCFS-compliant ethanol is 
the sugarcane-based ethanol from Brazil, but Brazil’s total ethanol export 
to the United States would not even cover California’s needs during the 
 
fuel produced from plant- or animal-based feedstock (referred to as ‘biomass’). The two most 
common forms of biofuel today are ethanol and biodiesel.  Biofuels are used primarily to fuel 
vehicles, but can also fuel engines or be used in fuel cells to generate electricity.  As countries seek 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector and lessen dependence on 
petroleum-based fuels, biofuels continue to attract attention as one possible solution. Biofuels offer a 
way to produce transportation fuels from renewable sources or waste materials and to reduce net 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions because the CO2 emitted during combustion of the fuel is captured 
during the growth of the feedstock.”). 
 95 Id. (“Corn ethanol is the most widely used liquid biofuel in the United States. Most of this 
ethanol is blended into gasoline for use in passenger vehicles.  Gasoline with up to 10 percent 
ethanol (E10) can be used in most vehicles without further modification, while special flexible fuel 
vehicles can use a gasoline-ethanol blend that has up to 85 percent ethanol (E85).”). 
 96 Id. (“Biodiesel is the other commonly used biofuel in the United States, primarily 
produced from soybean oil. The most common blend of U. S. biodiesel is 20 percent biodiesel/80 
percent petroleum diesel (B20). Biodiesel can be legally blended with petroleum diesel in any 
fraction, though vehicle system modifications may be required for percentages higher than B20.”). 
 97 See FUELING CALIFORNIA, LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD ISSUE BRIEF: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT RESEARCH AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 9 (Sept. 11, 
2012), available at  www.fuelingcalifornia.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/LCFS-Issue-Brief-
FINAL.pdf; see also Gerrard & Howe, supra note 60, at 633. 
 98 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 2011 PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT 
88 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/advisorypanel/20111208_LCFS%20program%20review%20
report_final.pdf. This is a conservative estimate.  CARB also projects that ethanol need could rise to 
2,742 million gallons by 2020. Id. 
 99 ANDREW CHANG & CO., THE FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CALIFORNIA 
GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006, at 193 (June 2012), available at 
http://cmta.net/pdfs/CMTA%20-%20AB%2032%20Report-Final.pdf (“California and Midwest 
ethanol and electricity have carbon intensities above the 2020 standard.”). 
 100 See FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 11. 
 101 GORDON SCHREMP, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RFS2, BIOFUEL SUPPLY, INFRASTRUCTURE & 
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lifetime of the LCFS.102  Locally produced alternatives to Brazilian 
ethanol (such as cellulosic ethanol fermented from grains and soy 
biomass) are currently too underdeveloped provide a viable answer to 
California’s growing ethanol needs, thereby calling the LCFS’s 15% 
GHG emissions target into question.103 
Second, the refinery industry also voices concerns about how 
compliance costs to reduce the carbon intensity of California’s fuels will 
affect fuel prices for consumers.  Fueling California104 points out that of 
CARB’s eleven compliance scenarios tracking the cost of gasoline and 
gasoline substitutes through 2020,105 seven of these scenarios predict 
price increases as high as $0.09 a gallon, while only four scenarios 
forecast price decreases of any kind.106  The refining industry also notes 
that all of CARB’s scenarios forecast an increase in diesel prices, ranging 
from $0.17 a gallon to $0.23 a gallon through 2020.107  Boston 
Consulting Group’s (BCG)108 study estimates that full implementation of 
the LCFS would create recovery costs in the range of $0.33 to $1.06 per 
gallon.109  According to BCG, these projections point to a massive 
 102 FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 11 (“CARB’s analysis of the LCFS assumes up to 
2.73 billion gallons of ethanol per year from sugarcane will be available for use in California by 
2020. Virtually all sugarcane ethanol, which has lower carbon intensity than corn-based ethanol, 
comes from Brazil and according to CEC (California Energy Commission) data no Brazilian ethanol 
has been exported to the U.S. since 2009. The Brazilian government’s own export projections, cited 
by the CEC, suggest only 500 million gallons of sugarcane ethanol will be sent to the entire U.S. 
market in 2020.”). 
 103 Id. (“Cellulosic ethanol is made from wood fiber or other waste plant materials and 
therefore has a much lower carbon intensity than corn ethanol. However, production of cellulosic 
ethanol is more difficult and has not yet reached commercial scale.”). 
 104 See generally Press Release, Fueling California, United, Chevron Among Members of 
New Group Looking To Impact California Fuel Policies (Aug. 19, 2009), available at 
www.fuelingcalifornia.org/newsroom/articles/united-chevron-among-members-of-new-group-
looking-to-impact-california-fuel-policies. Fueling California is a nonprofit entity comprising 
refinery businesses and large fuel consumers such as Chevron, United Airlines, UPS, Union Pacific 
Railroad, Con-Way, Harris Ranch, Ambassador International and the Avis Budget Group. See id. 
 105 FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 13; see also CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 96, at 
129. 
 106 FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 13; see also CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 96 at 
129. 
 107 CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 96, at 130. 
 108 The Boston Consulting Group is a consulting firm that specializes in risk management and 
business strategy; see Mission, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP, 
www.bcg.com/about_bcg/vision/mission.aspx (last visited May 1, 2014) (describing BCG’s 
mission); see generally Dana Hall, Chevron and Its Allies Take Aim at California’s Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2013, 
www.mercurynews.com/ci_22492404/chevron-and-its-allies-take-aim-at-californias (describing how 
The Boston Consulting Group’s 2012 study of California’s LCFS was commissioned by the Western 
States Petroleum Association). 
 109 THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., Understanding the Impact of AB 32, at 4 (June 19, 2012), 
available at www.secureourfuels.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/BCG_report.pdf; see also 
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disruption of California’s economy and refinery capacity, challenging the 
LCFS’s viability through 2020.110 
The refining industry also believes that ethanol shortages and 
unrecovered compliance costs stand to cause a sizable disruption of 
California’s economy.111  BCG projects that the lack of available ethanol 
and biodiesel could result in the shutdown of approximately six 
California refineries during the 2015-2017 compliance period and 
approximately two more refineries if the LCFS is fully implemented.112  
Closures of that magnitude would account for a projected loss of 
approximately 28,000 manufacturing jobs and a shift toward reliance on 
foreign imports in order to satiate the state’s demand for ethanol and 
biodiesel.113  California also stands to lose up to $4.4 billion in tax 
revenue, mostly as uncollected fuel excise taxes, as these refineries are 
shut down.114  Analysis by Stonebridge Associates, Inc.115 indicates that 
the LCFS will disadvantage middle-class workers within the logistics 
departments of these refineries,116 and that rising diesel costs will 
displace over 616,922 individuals working on containerization imports 
within the state.117  Higher diesel prices will also discourage out-of-state 
businesses from exporting to California, and the state is primed to lose 
 
FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 17 (“The cost of compliance could end up being much 
higher if the price per ton of carbon increases and becomes volatile (increasing to a total of $2.70 per 
gallon based on a $150/ton estimate) or if other states or the nation adopt similar LCFS policies. As 
well, the cost of compliance can fluctuate due to the availability of biofuels.”). 
 110 THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 109, at 32-33 (“Without sufficient sugarcane or 
cellulosic ethanol or adequate LCFS credits, refiners will be unable to meet the LCFS and will be 
forced to cease production or export even more fuel, potentially resulting in disruption of fuels 
supply throughout California. While it is difficult to quantify the financial impact, we believe that 
this potential for disruption of California’s fuels supply is sufficient to make LCFS unviable.”). 
 111 See FUELING CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 19. 
 112 See THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 109, at 3. 
 113 Id. This is a conservative estimate for BCG’s calculations.  They also predict fuel 
shortages and unrecovered compliance costs could displace up to 51,000 manufacturing jobs. Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Stonebridge Associates Inc. is an legislative consulting firm based in California; see 
generally Services, STONEBRIDGE, www.stonebridge-associates.com/services.html (last visited May 
21, 2014) (describing Stonebridge Associates’ client services). See also Study Finds That 
“California-Only” Diesel Will Come at High Cost for State, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 25, 2012, 
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/study-finds-that-california-only-diesel-will-come-at-high-cost-
for-state-148936795.html (describing how the California Trucking Association commissioned 
Stonebridge Associates’ 2012 study on California’s LCFS). 
 116 See STONEBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC. THE IMPACT OF THE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD AND 
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAMS ON CALIFORNIA RETAIL DIESEL PRICES 3-5 (Apr. 25, 2012), available 
at http://caltrux.org/sites/default/files/CTALCFS.pdf. 
 117 Id. 
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roughly $95.5 billion just tied to the price spike in diesel alone.118  
Taking into account projected ethanol shortages, spikes in fuel prices, 
and the hit to California’s economy, the refining industry is largely 
pessimistic about the success of California’s market-based approach to 
GHG reduction. 
However, while the refining industry paints a grim picture of 
California’s LCFS, such studies were conducted on the eve of the 
measure’s implementation and by parties with a vested interest in fossil 
fuel consumption.  In the three years since the LCFS rolled out its initial 
compliance period, several independent studies paint a far different 
picture of the LCFS’s ability to transform the California fuel market 
while reducing the state’s overall GHG emissions. 
B. NOT EASY BEING GREEN: INDEPENDENTLY TRACKING THE 
PROGRESS OF CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 
California’s LCFS sets annual declining targets for the carbon 
intensity of California’s fuels, with a carbon intensity reduction that 
starts at 0.25% in 2011 and increases to 10% by 2020.119  Since 2011, 
several entities independent of the refinery industry have tracked the 
LCFS’s effectiveness in reducing the carbon intensity of California’s 
fuels, overall program compliance, and its economic effect on the state as 
a whole.  Studies conducted by several departments at the University of 
California Davis (UC Davis), as well as a study from Mills College, 
examine the three-year beginning of California’s LCFS to help provide 
insight about its long-term viability. 
California’s expanded implementation of renewable fuels within the 
2011-2013 compliance period indicates that the LCFS is beginning to 
drive innovation within the renewable fuels market.  UC Davis points out 
that “[a]lternative fuels under the [LCFS] program increased from 6.3% 
of total transport energy use in California in 2011 to 6.8% in the first half 
of 2013.”120  Moreover, the 2011-2013 compliance period suggests that 
 118 Id. at 4 (projecting job loss in the containerization imports sector amounting to “$68.5 
billion in lost state domestic product, $21.7 billion in lost income and $5.3 billion in lose state and 
local taxes”). 
 119 Sonia Yeh & Julie Witcover, Status Review of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
January 2014 Issue, U.C. DAVIS INST. TRANSP. STUD. Jan. 2014, at 2, available at 
www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=2008 (“The standard requires 
reductions of 0.25%, 0.5%, and 1% in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, below [carbon intensity] 
baselines established for conventional gasoline and diesel fuels sold in California. The standard 
requires a 2.5% [carbon intensity] reduction in 2015, and increases in stringency in subsequent years 
(reaching 10% reduction in 2020).”). 
 120 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 1. 
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local fuel production is already resulting in renewable ethanol 
alternatives that have lower carbon intensities to meet the LCFS 
declining annual targets.  “[E]thanol’s contribution (primarily using corn 
or grain mixes) 121 to LCFS credits122 decreased from 70-80% in 2011 
through 2013 Q1, to 52% in 2013 Q2 [with an] increasing share of 
biofuel LCFS credits [coming] from use of waste-based fuels 
(biodiesel/renewable diesel from tallow or waste oils and ethanol from 
beverage wastes).”123  In response to BCG’s 2012 study, UC Davis also 
notes that the contribution of several renewable fuels, rather than a one-
for-one replacement for Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol, could still keep 
refineries in compliance, while satiating California’s fuel needs 
throughout the life of the LCFS.124  The increase of LCFS-compliant 
renewables is significant because it illustrates the beginnings of 
alternative fuel innovation, as well as contribution toward the 15% GHG 
reduction from the use of low-carbon fuels. 
Yet early industry compliance with the LCFS does more than drive 
innovation for the next generation of alternative fuels—it also results in 
the creation of carbon credits to stabilize future compliance costs for 
California refineries.  During the reporting period for UC Davis’s study 
(2011 Q1-2013 Q2), refineries complying with the LCFS generated 1.64 
million carbon credits, 61% more credits than necessary to cover total 
generated deficits up to that point.125  UC Davis noted that while there is 
some concern about the volatility of these credits within the secondary 
trading market itself, prices have largely trended upward throughout this 
 121 As the discussion in Part III.A pointed out, corn-based ethanol possesses a higher carbon 
intensity rating than sugarcane or other biomass-based ethanol blends under the LCFS.  While the 
refinery industry believes that reliance on other biomass-based ethanol is too risky, given its 
underdeveloped status for commercial use, California’s fuel market over the first three years of the 
LCFS is challenging that notion, as indicated by the rise in production of lower-carbon, non-corn 
ethanol. 
 122 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 3. The presence of credits is important insofar as the 
LCFS’s cap is concerned because “LCFS credits and deficits are generated based on emissions 
below or above the standard. The credits can be traded or banked over time.” Id. 
 123 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 1. 
 124 John Weyant et al., Expert Evaluation of the Report: “Understanding The Impacts of 
AB32,” U.C. DAVIS POL’Y INST. FOR ENERGY, ENV’T & ECON., May 2013, at 13, available at 
http://policyinstitute.ucdavis.edu/files/general/pdf/2013-05-09_Expert-Evaluation-of-BCG-
Report.pdf (“The BCG report consistently relies on a single expected compliance strategy for 
California refineries – imported sugarcane ethanol. Furthermore the expanded demand for that 
product does not appear to trigger a supply response; the price is anticipated to grow dramatically 
without an increase in supply even though there is time for supply to expand to meet anticipated 
demand. Although a number of other strategies are identified, they are given no weight in the 
calculation of compliance. Even small contributions from the various other strategies would 
collectively have an important influence on the reduction needed in sugarcane ethanol.”). 
 125 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 3. 
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first compliance period, resting around $50 per credit as of December 
2013.126  Referencing the LCFS’s credit creation thus far is important as 
it relates to mechanisms for refineries to control compliance costs when 
the LCFS cap declines more stringently after 2015.127  With the current 
creation of excess of carbon credits early in the LCFS’s implementation, 
refineries now have the ability to bank these credits for later use without 
having to shoulder the allegedly crippling compliance costs affecting fuel 
prices, factory closures, and job loss.128 
Refineries with the ability to bank carbon credits would not be the 
only entities benefitting from the savings produced by the LCFS.  While 
the refinery industry expressed concern over consumers shouldering the 
spikes in fuel prices, a new study from Mills College actually suggests 
that the LCFS will lead to consumer savings.129  Mills College reaffirms 
the findings made by UC Davis, suggesting that the LCFS is 
overachieving in its first compliance period by displacing roughly 2.8 
billion gallons of petroleum-based fuels, while decreasing the fuel carbon 
intensity of California’s fuels by 5.4 million tons.130  This petroleum 
displacement has resulted in a substantial number of banked credits, 
“representing over compliance with [LCFS] requirements by about 60% 
on average, or an excess of 2.0 million credits, which is equivalent to 
over half of the amount needed to meet the current 2014 LCFS 
requirements.”131  Mills College projects that the introduction of greater 
quantities of renewable fuels will help diversify California’s fuel market, 
lowering the market power for petroleum-based fuels.132  Projected fuel 
diversification will take the form of a 1.3% reduction in fuel prices 
overall (roughly $0.04 per gallon), as well as an annual savings of 
roughly $837 million for California consumers.133  In other words, 
California’s gambit is currently working to drive fuel innovation, provide 
 126 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 7 (“LCFS credit prices increased from $16 per credit 
in 2012 to $75-$85 per credit in November 2013.  According to PFL Markets Daily, prices declined 
to about $50 per credit by mid-December.”). 
 127 Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119, at 2. 
 128 Weyant et al., supra note 124, at 6 (“Finally, the accumulation of LCFS credits has been 
substantial in the first eight quarters of the program. If sustained even at current levels, the 
accumulation seems likely to ease the transition toward satisfying the LCFS.”). 
 129 See JASMIN ANSAR & ROBERT SPARKS, MILLS COLLEGE, INCREASING MARKET 
COMPETITION TO REDUCE THE LEVEL AND VARIABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION FUEL PRICES: A 
CASE STUDY ON CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 2 (Mar. 2014), available at 
http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_14040101a.pdf. 
 130 Id. at 3. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 2. 
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savings for industry and consumers alike, and create market-driven 
reductions in GHGs emissions. 
C. THE CHICKEN DANCE: INDUSTRY PRESSURE AND THE LIMITED 
REACH OF STATES NECESSITATES FEDERAL GUIDANCE IN CURBING 
GHG EMISSIONS 
Subparts A and B have outlined two potential futures for California 
under the LCFS, one detrimental to California’s economic stability, and 
one projecting continued technological growth and tangible GHG 
reduction.  Yet it is important to understand how these divergent 
positions on California’s novel GHG reduction policy also bookend the 
nationwide discussion regarding market-based GHG reduction.  The oil 
industry has remained largely resistant thus far, enlisting third-party 
consulting firms to drum up nightmare scenarios about new market-
based GHG reduction measures.134  Moreover, studies like the ones 
conducted by UC Davis and Mills College are essential for tracking 
progress of newly implemented market-based schemes, but they are not 
necessarily indicative of assured long-term success for GHG reduction 
plans like California’s LCFS.  The uncertainty of both scenarios, coupled 
with the often-stringent limitation on state authority to act, places the 
responsibility on Congress to fashion strong guidelines for GHG 
reduction. 
The threat of global climate change and the future of the United 
States’ energy independence are too valuable to allow Congress the 
luxury of silence—it can’t chicken out.135  As Part II indicates, a major 
paradigm shift is required to promote federal guidance in market-based 
GHG reduction, regardless of the success or failure of California’s 
experiment. 
 134 Geoff Dembicki, Big Oil and Canada Thwarted U.S. Carbon Standards, SALON (Dec. 25, 
2011), www.salon.com/2011/12/15/big_oil_and_canada_thwarted_u_s_carbon_standards/. The 
article examines how Canadian and U.S. oil companies contracted with PR firms to create non-profit 
organizations designed to kill low-carbon fuel legislation.  The article details the creation of the 
Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA), an organization that prepared ‘easy-to-read and user friendly 
informational briefs’ targeted at trade associates and unions in the hopes of applying political 
pressure to stop LCFS measures in Northeast/Mid Atlantic states. Id. See generally CONSUMER 
ENERGY ALLIANCE, ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A REGIONAL LOW CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD ON NORTHEAST/MID-ATLANTIC STATES (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://consumerenergyalliance.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/The-Economic-Impact-of-a-
Regional-Low-Carbon-Fuel-Standard-on-Northeast-Mid-Atlantic-States.pdf. 
 135 Cf. Arrested Development—Chicken Dance (Whole Family), YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TphEh0Qgv0. Again, referencing this FOX/Netflix comedy 
felt appropriate given Congress’s reticence to fashion strong GHG reduction policies. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ARRESTED: THE PARADIGM SHIFT NEEDED TO 
IMPLEMENT A NATIONAL AND FEASIBLE MARKET-BASED 
APPROACH TO GHG REDUCTION 
While states such as California are making incremental progress in 
reducing GHG emissions within the U.S. transportation sector, state 
action is fairly limited in its effectiveness.  As stated in Part II, 
meaningful GHG reduction requires stronger federal guidance.  The 
following Subparts outline two potential paths for congressional 
guidance. Subpart A focuses on a methodology that works within the 
doomsday scenarios put forth by the oil industry.  Subpart B advocates 
the use of California’s LCFS as a blueprint for a national market-based 
measure to reduced GHGs.  Both Subparts suggest a low carbon fuel 
standard in different fashions to achieve the same result: a feasible, 
market-based approach to GHG reduction. 
A. YOU ARE GOING TO GET HOP-ONS: CONGRESS SHOULD 
IMPLEMENT A FLEXIBLE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD THAT 
REWARDS COMPLIANT BUSINESSES WITH MONETARY INCENTIVES 
Congress can still use a modified low carbon fuel standard as a 
mechanism for GHG reduction despite the refinery industry’s fears that 
such a measure will cause fuel shortages and high compliance costs that 
disrupt local economies. While the refinery industry might paint 
California’s LCFS implementation as infeasible, using a low carbon fuel 
standard may still be important piece of market-based environmental 
policy.136  By implementing a GHG measurement for all periods of a 
fuel’s life cycle, a low carbon fuel standard is able to relay important 
information about the human interaction with a particular product, which 
can allow policymakers to fashion decisions based on that behavior.137 
One approach Congress could use is implementing a flexible low 
carbon fuel standard on the national level, one that uses such life cycle 
 136 STEPHEN P. HOLLAND ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, GREENHOUSE GAS 
REDUCTIONS UNDER LOW CARBON FUELS STANDARDS? 31 (July 2007), available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w13266.pdf?new_window=1 (“We show that the LCFS is more likely to 
increase carbon emissions if (i) supply and/or demand for the high carbon fuel are relatively 
steep . . . .”). 
 137 See generally U.S. EPA, LIFE-CYCLE GHG ACCOUNTING VERSUS GHG EMISSION 
INVENTORIES,  (undated), available at http://epa.gov/epawaste/conserve/tools/warm/pdfs/life-cycle-
ghg-accounting-versus-ghg-emission-inventories10-28-10.pdf (“A life-cycle perspective accounts 
for all emissions connected to the good or service, regardless of which industrial or economic 
activities or sectors produce these emissions (e.g., energy, mining, manufacturing, or waste sectors) 
and when these benefits occur over time.”). 
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measurements as a means of eligibility for monetary incentives.138  
These monetary incentives could be in the form of tax breaks for 
refineries that fall under the cap of a national low carbon fuel standard, 
or eligibility for federal grants and loans to use in the development of 
alternative fuels.139  This would be a concerted move away from the 
mandatory cap-and-trade program in California, and it would tend to 
support businesses that already create products with
This would be a good approach, should Congress buy into the 
refinery industry’s rhetoric, because it is not passive.  A flexible cap that 
would emphasize rewarding successfully developed alternative fuels can 
help the fuel market adjust to innovation, rather than simply punishing 
non-compliant entities.140  In other words, Congress might be more 
successful in swaying refinery companies with the honey of tax breaks or 
development grants, rather than the vinegar of a mandatory compliance 
cap.141  Once the market illustrates the viability of these advanced 
renewable fuels, other refineries will invariably hop on board, 
developing and producing more low-carbon fuels in order to keep up 
with their competitors.  Therefore, as the market and means for low-
carbon fuels grow, the United States’ GHG emissions should decline. 
B. THERE IT IS: CONGRESS SHOULD USE CALIFORNIA’S LCFS AS THE 
BLUEPRINT FOR A NATIONWIDE LCFS 
Congress should explore a national market-based GHG reduction 
scheme similar to that of California’s LCFS.  Part III outlined the 
encouraging potential of California’s LCFS as a novel approach to 
market-based GHG reduction, one that can stimulate the state’s economy 
and advance renewable fuel technology.142  Though a national low 
carbon fuel standard has already failed to pass the Senate once before 
 138 HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 136, at 31 (“In fact, a regulator’s best option may be to 
choose a nonbinding LCFS . . . .”). 
 139 Id. (“[A]n energy-based LCFS, which subsidizes low-carbon fuels (primarily renewables), 
may be a second best policy instrument for addressing multiple policy goals with one instrument.”). 
 140 See TRISHA SHRUM, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: POLICY AND ECONOMICS 29 (June 15, 
2007), available at www.carbontax.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/kansas-energy-council_ghg-
review.pdf (“Research and development subsidies can help to correct market failure and 
underinvestment in a public good.”). 
 141 JEREMIAH DONOR, BARRIERS TO ADOPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 21 
(May 2007), available at 
http://irps.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/research/documents/IRPSDonerWorkingPaper050707.pdf 
(“Policies such as research and development, financial incentives, and procurement initiatives are 
appropriate for stimulating commercialization and initial markets for new technologies, which can 
create a ‘technology push.’”). 
 142 See generally Yeh & Witcover, supra note 119. 
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(2010’s Waxman-Markey Bill143), evidence of a successful LCFS on the 
state level could help persuade Congress that such an approach could be 
a feasible, nationwide approach for GHG reduction.  Congress faces the 
difficult task of accounting for the economy and resource use of an entire 
country; however, Congress now has the benefit of watching California’s 
methodology and implementation.  Congress should begin investigating 
this method now, so it can adjust for obstacles California might face at 
the end of its program in 2020.  California’s LCFS may have opened to 
door to a feasible, market-based approach to GHG reduction, but 
Congress must walk through that door for the benefit of the United States 
and the world at large. 
CONCLUSION 
Market-based measures will undoubtedly play a crucial role in 
future efforts to curb GHG emissions.  The United States—and Congress 
in particular—faces the difficult task of fashioning legislation that will 
balance concerns about shared natural resources and future economic 
growth.  While there are concerns about the viability of current market-
based strategies to produce long-term GHG reductions and technological 
innovation, continuing to subsist under the yoke of fossil fuel is not a 
viable option either at home or abroad.  If market-based measures are to 
be successful, Congress must develop a framework that encourages 
alternative fuel development, transitioning us away from fossil fuels 
while reducing GHG emissions. 
Feasible market-based approaches to GHG reduction are just one 
facet of a larger, more complex conversation about addressing global 
climate change. Yet the issue of global climate change is a race against 
time, one better handled with cooperative goals, instead of isolationist 
lawmaking, public-relations wars, or willful blindness. Policymakers 
should remain mindful of the limitations of market-based GHG reduction 
measures, while taking note of the pioneering efforts present in states 
like California.  To that end, Congress must use federalism as a catalyst 
for change rather than legislative stalemate.  Congress must depend on 
states as laboratories of innovation, to help spur nationwide strategies in 
 143 See generally Kate Sheppard, Was Waxman-Markey a Waste of Energy?, 
MOTHERJONES.COM, Mar. 9, 2010, www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/03/waxman-markey-
senate-climate-kerry-graham-lieberman (providing an overview of the politics surrounding the 
eventual demise of the Waxman-Markey Bill, a national cap-and-trade program that failed to pass 
the Senate in 2010). 
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us,144 and strategies the United States implements to combat global 
climate change will undoubtedly have an important impact on the future 
of our planet. 
 
 144 Unlike the critically acclaimed Arrested Development (from which this article borrows its 
title) neither the United States nor the world at large can bank on a direct-to-Netflix revival should 
global climate change pull the plug on our planet. 
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